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______________________________________________________________________________ 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) aims to stimulate and promote 
innovation, to strengthen the nation’s industry and economy, and to maintain the United States’ 
technological competitiveness on a global scale. One type of intellectual property protection 
offered by the USPTO is patents. Patent protection offers inventors a legal title to their 
innovation, as well as the right to exclude others from making, using, selling or importing their 
patented work for a term of 20 years. In exchange, the inventor agrees to publicly disclose 
information about their innovation. Prior to 1980, the patents of federally-funded research 
projects for small businesses and nonprofits, such as universities, were held by the U.S. 
government, resulting in billions of dollars of research innovation being unapplied for public use. 
The Bayh-Doyle Act marked a shift of patent titles and licensing responsibilities away from the 
government to the federally-funded research entities. This shift caused exponential growth in 
industrial innovation and “technology transfer” at academic institutions. In particular, patents of 
“natural products” skyrocketed in volume for the field of biotechnology. However, a string of 
Supreme Court decisions in the early 21st century, particularly the highly publicized Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., cast new uncertainty on the patentability of 
natural products. This study briefly reviews the patenting landscape of biotechnology leading up 
to Myriad and aims to provide greater insight as to the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision at 
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the level of academic research institutions, as perceived by surveyed members of the Association 
of University Technology Managers (AUTM). Statistically significant results were achieved on 
data in the following six areas: (1) demographics of survey respondents, (2) patenting behaviors 
post-Myriad, (3) attitudes toward patenting (in general), (4) attitudes toward Myriad, (5) the use 
of certain patenting strategies post-Myriad. However, there was insufficient survey response on 
section (6)—attitudes toward those same strategies (perception of their effectiveness)—to make 
claims from the data. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
BACKGROUND 
Patent Law in the United States 
Patent protection plays a vital role in the United States’ economy. It stimulates industry 
and new job creation and helps to promote public access to better goods and services within the 
nation’s free market system. Within this competitive economic atmosphere, having the 
opportunity to safeguard one’s commercialization prospects and to gain a market advantage 
provides valuable incentives for new innovation. For research entities in particular, it helps them 
to maximize the return of grant investments and to apply the findings of their work to real-world 
applications through industry. In summary, patent protection creates a structure for technology 
transfer and regulation that encourages the following responses: disclosure of invention details 
rather than data secrecy; investment in research efforts; and further investment in the product 
development, marketing and commercialization of innovation (Crespi). 
The process of patent acquisition can take several years from the time of the initial 
application submission. In order to receive a patent, the inventor must demonstrate that their 
claim meets certain standards for novelty (originality), inventiveness (non-obviousness), and 
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utility (useful application). Patents cannot be acquired for innovation that was formerly presented 
to the public or exists in “prior art” (works predating the application submission for the patent 
claim). When an inventor receives a patent, they have exclusive title and licensing rights to the 
innovation. This legal right entitles the inventor to exclude others from making, using, selling or 
importing their patented work for a term of 20 years. In exchange for this patent protection, the 
inventor must make a public disclosure of their innovation, including the “best most” of using 
the claimed invention. The tradeoff of legal protection for data sharing aims to promote 
innovative process, because other entities will be able to use information from the patent 
disclosure in order to further advance their own innovative works. 
The economic value of a patent is derived from the tangible nature of the innovation in 
question (Crespi); therefore, the definition of “patent eligible” material is largely concerned with 
the application of ideas to inventions or processes rather than abstract concepts or research 
theories. This distinction excludes laws of natural or physical phenomena, such as the wind, from 
being patented, as these categories are considered to be non-exclusive expressions of nature and 
not the creation of any one person. The U.S. Supreme Court noted, “Without this exception [for 
natural phenomena], there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents would ‘tie up’ 
the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’ This would be 
at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation.” (pg. 11 of AMP 
Supreme Court case). As technology advances, the boundaries of what subject material is “patent 
eligible” continues to be shaped by case law and by precedents set by the USPTO. Within the 




Products Marketed products and substances (e.g. “natural products”, semi-synthetic 
penicillin, fermentation products) 
Compositions (e.g. new chemical mixtures for application in pharmaceuticals or in 
pharmaceutical or insecticides) 
Processes and 
methods of use 
Process in preparation; also use of new strains, new species, particular 
fermentation methods, etc. 
Misc. Methods Methods of treatment (e.g. herbicidal treatment, meat tenderizing, 
human/animal treatment) and testing (concerned with quality control) 
 
Within the first category, controversy has arisen over the question of the patent eligibility 
for “natural products”—isolated or purified organic substances, found in or derived from nature. 
This area of research is one of great importance to the field of biotechnology. The difficulty of 
defining the patent eligibility of natural products stems from the distinction between actions of 
invention and actions of mere discovery. As previously stated, a patent requires novelty and 
inventiveness. Can natural products—such as nucleic acids, foods, bacteria, proteins and 
peptides, chemicals from natural sources including antibiotics and resins—be said to be “novel” 
when they naturally occur in biological organisms? Some individuals argue that nothing new has 
been created by the isolation of these natural products; the product has been merely separated 
from its naturally occurring state in an organism. Therefore, they do not meet the standards of 
novelty and innovation. On the other side of that argument, the isolation and purification of 
natural products enables a sense of “utility” that the product does not have within the organism. 
cannot exist within their natural state in an organism. This is claimed to be a form of innovation. 
For those on the former end of the argument, a blanket denial of all natural product claims may 
seem to be the clearest solution to defining patent eligibility in this area. However, the research 
process surrounding these natural products—of providing new tangible applications to the 
knowledge acquired on natural phenomena—is so akin to the procedure of typical innovation 
that this extreme of a path seems to contradict previously established precedent for what is patent 
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eligible. A 2004 IP resource for scientists and engineers provided the following non-exhaustive 







However, this summary has continued to become more nuanced and narrower, necessitating a 
continued reevaluation of the boundaries of patenting for natural products. The USPTO’s 2019 
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guide had the following to say about natural product 
patenting: 
“novel, useful and non-obvious microbes, plants, animals, natural and 
synthetic compounds, genes, proteins, DNA, RNA, recombinant cells, 
proteins expressed by genes in recombinant proteins, processes for recovery 
of proteins, processes for medically delivering recombinant proteins, and 
methods of altering natural properties of plants such as stress, disease or 
pest resistance.” (Rockman).  
 
“The Supreme Court has held that the patent eligibility statute, Section 
101, contains an implicit exception for ‘[l]aws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas,’’ which are ‘‘the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.’ Yet, the Court has explained that ‘[a]t some level, 
all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,’ and has cautioned ‘to tread 
carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of 




The Rise of Modern Biotechnology 
The question of natural product patents is particularly relevant in the context of 
prominent biotechnological research landscape. The concept of biotechnology is not a recent 
one. It long predates this century, tracing as far back in history as 6000 B.C.E. with the use of 
yeast in beer production by the Sumerians (Rockman). This notion has continued to evolve over 
the centuries. In the modern age, the field of biotechnology has been marked by the use of 
recombinant DNA and the application of recombinant organisms to both industry and 
environmental projects.  
In conjunction with Congress’ Bayh-Doyle Act (discussed further in the following 
section), patents in biotechnology research skyrocketed after a 1980 Supreme Court decision 
determining that the bounds of patent eligibility encompassed “anything under the sun made by 
man”, so long as the innovation met the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and utility 
(Rooksby). Shortly after this decision, recombinant human insulin, used in the treatment of type 
1 diabetes, was commercialized for the first time. A wave of advancements ensued for process 
development in biotechnology, leading to the creation of new media, buffers, solutions and 
equipment involved in methods of protein production (Rockman). “Gene patents” of nucleotides 
coding for a specific protein skyrocketed in volume through the late 1990s. This onslaught of 
new biological products augmented the relevance of the “natural product problem” in patenting, 






Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980 // The Birth of University Technology Transfer 
The surge of biological patent claims in the 1980s was further influenced by the Bayh-
Doyle Act of Congress. Until this point, the U.S. government had the title and sole rights for 
licensing of federally-funded research projects, including those conducted at academic 
institutions. However, this system was leaving billons of research findings unused, “collecting 
dust on the shelves”. Only a small percentage of these patented innovations was being licensed 
for industry, resulting in a very low return on public benefit for the billions of taxpayer dollars 
flowing into this research. With this new legislation, Congress shifted patent title and licensing 
responsibilities to the entities performing the government funded research. This change permitted 
small businesses and non-profit entities, including universities, to better maximize of the fruits of 
their federally-funded research endeavors (McDevitt), while the government retained certain 
royalty-free licensing rights for certain federal purposes (AUTM). The shift was largely 
motivated, not by the goal of benefitting the individual federally-funded entities, but rather by 
the desire to maximize the public value of research innovation. Two assumptions were prominent 
in driving this shift: (1) the economic supposition that research with potential commercial return 
would receive greater private investment and (2) the belief that these federally-funded entities 
would be able to industrialize a greater volume of patented innovation for the benefit of public 
use.  
Indeed, the Bayh-Doyle Act succeeded in stimulating commercialization of patented 
innovation. Prior to the implementation of this legislation, less than 5% of the 28,000 federally-
funded patents held by the U.S. government had been licensed for industry use (McDewitt). The 
government’s exclusive title on federally-funded research had, in fact, caused a stumbling block 
for these research innovations to move outside of the lab and become useful in the public sphere. 
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By transferring the rights of ownership away from the federal government, Congress moved the 
responsibility of technology transfer and licensing to smaller entities, such as universities, which 
were better positioned to promote the real-work implementation of their research in industry. The 
Bayh-Doyle Act aimed—and succeeded—in funneling taxpayer-funded research back to 
contributing to a public good. This shift helped to maximize the return on billions of dollars 
poured by the government into federally-funded research, through agencies such as the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Health (NIH) (AUTM).  
The Bayh-Doyle Act greatly impacted industry growth out of academic research 
institutions. Between 1980 and 2007, roughly 60% of academic biomedical research was 
conducted with some form of federal funding (Rai). The transfer of patent ownership encouraged 
research investments for products such as Gatorade®, the Breathlyzer®, the OncoMouse® (a 
genetically modified mouse used for research testing), numerous vaccinations and various 
diagnostic and therapeutic cancer treatments. (Rooksby, AUTM). The resulting rising patent 
volume from these academic institutions necessitated the growth of a new profession: university 
technology transfer. This field is described by the Association for University Technology 
Managers (AUTM) as “the process of transferring scientific findings from one organization to 
another for the purpose of further development and commercialization” (McDevitt). Today, 
Technology Licensing Offices (TLO) play an increasingly vital role in the management of 
academic research discovery and innovation.  
Pros and Cons of Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer professionals play a vital role in transforming the research in labs 
into commercial or publicly-accessible products or services through various means, including 
collaboration with or licensing to a private exterior company (AUTM, Pradhan). This 
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maximization of real-world research impact has great industrial implications. Public benefits of 
technology transfer include the economic creation of jobs, new industries and better products for 
public access. Over 4,000 companies have been birthed from university research since the 
passing of the Bayh-Doyle Act, particularly at a regional and local level near universities 
(AUTM). This growth in entrepreneurial innovation has stimulated the nation’s economy and has 
pushed the United States forward as a competitive leading power on the global stage of 
innovation (AUTM). According to a 2015 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the United States ranks first globally for number of biotechnology 
firms (11,367) followed by Spain (2,831) and France (1,950) (Phillips). For good reason, the 
collaborative effort of U.S. universities, the federal government and commercial businesses have 
been termed “the envy of every nation” (Tansey). 
Despite these industrial benefits, concerns have been raised that the Bayh-Doyle Act has, 
in fact, created greater conflicts of interest in research. A university emphasis on profit-making 
may reduce support for its “fundamental discovery” research. Bias, or at least the appearance of 
bias, can also create public mistrust of medical research efforts (Tansey). For example, 
companies with a vested economic interest may use their influence to censor research findings 
that have unfavorable implication for their own business. Reports of this type of information 
suppression tarnish public opinion of research. In addition, federal funding of university 
biomedical patents can become controversial if these universities later assert their patents against 
individual commercial entities (Rai). Lastly, there exists a concern of data sharing in relation to 
patent protection. The proper public reporting of patents, their licensing and their practical use 
would lead to a strong, thriving database for innovation; however, there have been concerns that 
federally funded academic patents do not encourage an open sharing of information. Rather, the 
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economic advantage of hoarding research discovery in order to receive future patents is argued to 
have become a roadblock to innovation (Rai). Each of these areas of concern continues to need 
to be addressed and balanced with the promotion of research innovation.  
While the benefits of licensing and funding are often emphasized, the revenue received 
from university patents is far from lucrative (McDewitt). The role of technology transfer is not 
simply commercial. Within the university, tech transfer promotes a culture of innovation both 
with faculty researchers and with students themselves. Practical experience in research has been 
shown to strengthen students’ academic success, as well as exposure them to the foundations of 
intellectual property creation (McDewitt). Technology transfer also aids in the dissemination of 
public knowledge through education outreach, journal publications, healthcare programs, etc. 
(Coticchia). Demonstrating the real-world application of university research helps the public to 
better understand its value, even if they do not understand all of the details of the work. This 
public perspective can aid universities in their support and fundraising outside of federally-
supported grants.  
Precedents to Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2013) 
The boom of biotechnical innovation after the Bayh-Doyle Act elevated the importance 
of natural product patenting, and several precedents began to narrow the boundaries for what 
products of nature constituted “patent eligible” subject matter. For example, a claim for an 
isolated and purified product from a raw plant was rejected by the USPTO because the product 
deemed to be merely produced in nature (Crespi). Similarly, another claim to an alcoholic extract 
was deemed patent-ineligible cases since its composition was the same of that found in nature 
and it did not demonstrate sufficient “invention” (Crespi). Attaining a natural product patent is 
largely contingent on an individual’s ability to distinguish between the patent claim and what is 
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found inherently out in nature. Mere stabilization of a compound does not necessarily lend 
patentability to it, nor does the isolation of a compound whose properties are the same as the 
natural substance from which it was isolated (Crespi).  
The boundaries of “invention” for natural product patent claims is tricky. In 1951 and 
1955, two patents were approved by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office for vitamin B12 (US 
Patent No. 2,563,794), a supplement used in the treatment of pernicious anemia. This decision 
was made on the grounds that, although B12 is derived from nature, great steps are necessary in 
order to make the vitamin’s activity useful in a manner not possible in its natural form. This 
process was deemed to constitute more than just a mere isolation of the vitamin (Crespi). In the 
same year as Bayh-Doyle (1980), the Supreme Court heard the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 
Through this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a “living, genetically altered (recombinant) 
microorganism” was eligible material for a patent (Rockman) due to modifications that 
distinguished it from products found in nature. The aftermath of the Chakrabarty decision was 
an outright explosion of biotechnological patenting. Regulations for the patenting of living 
organisms was further clarified by the U.S. Patent Office in the wake of Ex parte Allen, 2 USPQ 
2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) after the rejection of a patent claim for a man-made oyster 
for failing to meet standards for “non-obviousness”. The Patent Commissioner affirmed the 
following in a public pronouncement: “The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-
naturally occurring non-human, multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be 
patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. §101 (the patent statute provision that 
defines patentable subject matter).”  
Of particular later relevance to the AMP v. Myriad case were precedents established for 
the patenting of nucleotide-based and genetic materials. Before the case’s decision was released, 
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public expectations leaned toward the Supreme Court finding some sort of exception for the 
patenting of genes (portions of DNA that code for proteins), keeping in line with nearly 30 years 
of patenting precedent that had allowed for “gene patents” (Graff). Nucleotide-related patenting 
had experienced a phase of exponential growth from the 1980s through 1998 or 1999, 
corresponding to the early sequencing of both the human genome and that of other species, 
(Graff). The early 2000s saw a shift away from simple isolated DNA or RNA patents, perhaps 
due to difficulties in creating commercial profit from them (Graff). In fact, several of Myriad 
Genetic Inc.’s patents in question were already set to expire in 2015—a mere two years later—
regardless of the Supreme Court’s ruling (Graff). This movement away from gene patents 
reduced the direct relevance of the Myriad ruling to genetics. However, it had a greater purported 
influence on natural product patenting as a whole. 
The United States Supreme Court case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (2013) was the third in a triad of cases related to natural product patenting, 
following Bilski v. Kappos (2010) and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories 
(2012) (Rai). Bilski v. Kappos narrowed the definition of patentable subject material for 
processes. This case instituted a “machine” or “transformation” test, which required that that the 
process in question either be designed to be carried out by a machine or be used to transform 
something to a different state (Offit). In the subsequent 2012 ruling of Mayo v. Prometheus, the 
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of two patent claims held by Mayo Collaborative Services 
on therapeutic thiopurine drugs. This decision found that the mere isolation of these drugs was a 
routine scientific procedure (Rai); therefore, their claims did not demonstrate sufficiently 
substantial “innovation” to distinguish the drugs from naturally occurring phenomena (Offit). In 
its summary of this ruling, the Supreme Court cited the following from Diamond v. Diehr 
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(1981): while §101 of the Patent Act exempts natural phenomena, laws of nature and abstract 
concepts from being patented, "an application of a law of nature . . . to a known structure or 
process may [deserve] patent protection," so long as that application extends beyond a simple 
restatement of the unpatentable abstract concept or 
law of nature with the words “apply it” following it 
(Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc). The Supreme Court’s Mayo ruling 
additionally determined the relationship between 
dosage and toxicity/effectiveness of a drug for patent 
eligibility, a distinction later relevant to antibody 
patenting (Murphy & Heithaus). The reasoning 
processes behind these two cases—Bilski v. Kappos 
and Mayo v. Prometheus—were particularly 
impactful to the evaluation of patent eligibility 
claims for subsequent the AMP v. Myriad case.  
Facts / Ruling of AMP v. Myriad 
The Supreme Court’s Mayo ruling cast 
uncertainty on the viability of a Federal Court ruling 
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patel). 
This case had addressed the patent eligibility of isolated human DNA sequences, which—like 
Mayo’s thiopurine drugs—were used for diagnostic medical practices, namely for assessing the 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer. Due to the similarity of the cases, the Myriad ruling was 
selected for review by the Supreme Court. 
Figure 1: Summary of Myriad case and 
BRCA1/2 patents 
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The plaintiffs of the Myriad case were a group of doctors, scientists, researchers, and 
patients represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation 
(PUBPAT). They argued that gene patents held by Myriad Genetics, Inc. —for Breast Cancer 
Susceptibility Genes 1 and 2: respectively BRCA1 and BRCA2—caused harm due to the 
restrictions the company was able to impose on research and patient treatment. Mutations to 
these genes serve as significant indicator for a woman’s risk of developing breast or ovarian 
cancer. After Myriad received patents for these genes, the company chose not to license their 
patent, precluding any other group from isolating these genes. Their resulting monopoly on 
diagnostic tests involving BRCA1/2 allowed the company to amass nearly $9 million in monthly 
revenue from their own BRCA diagnostic tests (Jaggar). However, in maintaining this economic 
advantage, Myriad Genetic, Inc. had—according to the plaintiffs—significantly harmed public 
interest. In addition to (a) limiting patients’ access to these tests due to their high cost, Myriad’s 
monopoly also (b) hoarded data rather than releasing it for public and research use and (c) 
prevented other organizations from creating alternative and improved diagnostic methods for the 
BRCA1/2 genes. Myriad’s monopoly-like tendencies pushed against the norm of university-held 
diagnostic patents to allow for outside nonexclusive licensing, bringing much public attention 
and emotional force behind the Myriad case (Rai).  
Before advancing to the U.S. Supreme Court as Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., this case was heard in Southern District Court of New York and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Through these lower court trials, a variety 
of interesting analogies were made for the natural product patent eligibility problem. One 
analogy compared the situation of a gene within a DNA sequence to that of a mineral stuck 
within a rock. While one judge contended that the mere extraction of a mineral from a rock 
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would not constitute “invention”, Myriad argued that—assuming novelty and non-obviousness—
the mineral would be patentable if human ingenuity was required to extract it, citing §101 of the 
Supreme Court’s prior Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers rulings. Myriad proposed an alternative 
analogy for the isolation of a gene from DNA: a tree and a baseball bat. They argued that the 
baseball bat exists within the tree, which itself exists in nature. It is the human ingenuity required 
to “extract” the baseball bat from the tree that makes it eligible for patenting. In a similar 
manner, Myriad argued that the extraction and purification of a single gene from DNA required 
sufficient human ingenuity to meet the requirements of valid patentable subject material (David). 
On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court reached its decision. The majority opinion of eight 
justices—Justice Scalia filed a separate concurring opinion—stated that the mere isolation of 
DNA, or the modifications made for the sole purpose of isolation, did not constitute a level of 
innovation necessary to distinguish native (genomic) DNA, also known as gDNA, from what 
occurs in nature. This distinction affirmed that the isolation of gDNA was akin to the analogy of 
extracting a mineral from rock. Natural resources within extractive industries are considered 
non-patentable (Evans); therefore, Myriad’s gDNA patent claims to BRCA1/2 were invalidated. 
However, the Supreme Court ruled that complementary DNA (cDNA) was, in fact, a patent 
eligible subject material. cDNA refers to synthetic DNA that mirrors the sequence of gDNA and 
from which introns (the portions of sequence that do not code for a gene product) have been 
removed (Offit). Therefore, Myriad’s gene patents for cDNA were affirmed.  
Support for the Myriad ruling 
 The Myriad decision reframed the legal framework of medical genetics (Evans). It 
surprised many technology transfer professionals and patent attorneys, essentially overturning 30 
years of allowance of gene patents by the USPTO. Despite this unsuspected shift in gene patent 
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eligibility, the Myriad ruling was largely cited as a victory by academic researchers (Chandra). 
Their ruling was in line with a concession presented in the reasoning for the prior Mayo decision: 
“the subject matter test is rooted in a policy concern that patents covering board subject matter 
will “preempt” too much future research” (Rai). By removing Myriad’s monopoly on BRCA1/2, 
the Supreme Court opened an avenue for other companies and researchers to begin creating 
alternative medical diagnostic tests for these genes. The Myriad ruling on the patent ineligibility 
of gDNA also assuaged broader concerns that gDNA patents would prevent whole genome 
sequencing (Rai). Francis Collins, director of NIH at the time of Myriad, supported the Court’s 
decision by emphasizing "Our position all along has been that patenting DNA in its natural state 
does not provide any benefit to the public. We can breathe a big sigh of relief that [law- suits] 
will no longer threaten to inhibit the progress of DNA research” (Marshall). However, much 
uncertainty was created by the Court’s second ruling on the standing of cDNA—exactly how 
much modification was necessary to denote true “innovation” rather than “discovery”, since 
mere isolation was deemed insufficient to protect gDNA by patents? 
By affirming the patent eligibility of cDNA, the Supreme Court may have also stepped 
back a bit from their prior Mayo decision, which classified the application of a routine scientific 
procedure as insufficient to confer “innovation” to what was otherwise a natural product. cDNA 
claims, such as those upheld for BRCA1/2, rely on intron removal, a process which might also 
be categorized as a routine scientific procedure (Rai). The Supreme Court did not articulate in it 
majority why cDNA patent claims were less problematic than those for gDNA (Rai). However, it 
has been noted that cDNA poses a lesser risk of being used to obstruct future research and allows 
scientists to freely segment natural DNA (Cartwright). The Solicitor General and geneticist Eric 
Lander purported that, for research purposes, cDNA claims can general be more easily worked 
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around than gDNA claims (Rai). In addition, from the perspective of prioritizing and 
incentivizing innovation, cDNA patents are generally considered to be more valuable than 
unmodified gDNA patents for commercialization prospects (Rai), due to being shorter and easier 
to work with within a lab setting than gDNA. 
The issues of public attention surrounding Myriad Genetic, Inc.’s monopoly (including 
high price, limited access to diagnostic test depending on one’s insurance, etc.) were not directly 
addressed by the Court, which chose instead to focus its response on the question of innovation 
and broader economic incentives (Rai). However, the Myriad decision did impede monopolies 
via a singular hold on a gDNA patent. Without this particular economic advantage, companies 
like Myriad would be pressed to maintain their competitive edge by improving their diagnostic 
product (for example, by enhancing quality, affordability, turnaround time or clearness of 
clinical reports) (Rai). This economic incentive was expected to notably benefit the patient and 
public consumer.  
Critics of the Myriad ruling 
Directly following the Myriad decision, certain leaders in the biotechnology industry 
posed the concern that it could “create business uncertainty for a broader range of biotechnology 
inventions” (Marshall). The rationale of the Supreme Court threw into concern patents on other 
natural materials, such as “human insulin, human cell receptors, warfarin, enzymes, bacteria, 
microbes, and many other biological entities” (Marshall). In addition to direct gene sequences, 
patents of antibodies for therapeutic applications were thought to be in danger under these new 
distinctions of non-patentable subject matter (Ponraj), as well as patents for epitope residues 
(Deng). Beyond its applications to diagnostics and gene patenting, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
was expected to influence other prominent areas of research, such as isolated protein and 
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embryonic stem cell patents. In addition, the Myriad ruling in a case of human genes would 
likely be applied more broadly to the genomes of other organisms, including agriculturally 
significant plants (Ledford).  
Although some university researchers strongly supported the Myriad ruling, others had 
concerns of its implications to biotechnological advancements. Included among these were 
concerns that the Court’s affirmation of cDNA patents would still impede labs from conducting 
research if they were to discover that the cDNA relied upon for their project was already 
patented by a company (Cartwright). In addition, the lack of innovative incentive through patent 
protection of natural products was feared to reduce the economic investment made in 
biotechnology research. Critics of the Myriad decision worried that such a lack of funding would 
impede research advancements and commercialization at universities, an end in total contrast to 
the USPTO’s aim to promote innovation. 
Concerns regarding proprietary databases 
The response of Myriad Genetics, Inc. in the wake of the 2013 Supreme Court decision 
also cast broader concerns on information sharing in research. Even after losing its gDNA 
patents, Myriad retained a powerful advantage through the accumulation of patients’ biodata in a 
privately-controlled, proprietary database. While contrary to the university push toward open 
science and data access for the support of research progress, the financial motivation of this 
strategy is understandable. Without the incentive of patents, laboratories who openly share their 
research data are at an economic disadvantage. Allowing public access to the databases they 
have had to pour money into to create would reduce their ability to profit from it. It makes more 
sense for them to secure the data for themselves and aim toward funneling the knowledge toward 
a commercialized application (Evans) Therefore, the question becomes one of reducing financial 
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loss that comes from the deep investments necessary to construct these databases. This system, 
intensified by a reduced ability to obtain patents, ultimately discourages data disclosure. 
This encouragement of proprietary databases has more than just economic implication. 
The system of data access advanced by the Myriad decision is doubted to promote an efficient, 
practical management of the “natural resource” of genomic information. The population of 
individuals having their genome sequences is a limited resource pool, as it excludes 10s of 
millions of people who may not have access to such testing, have no medical need for a genetic 
test, or do not express a personal curiosity in their genetic sequencing. Therefore, fragmentation 
of proprietary genetic databases threatens to create barriers to discovering important genotypic-
phenotypic relationships. If sustained, this practice could significantly affect the quality of the 
investment return for these genetic research projects. (Evans). Professor Barbara Evans at the 
University of Houston Law Center compared the mining of the human genome to the 
exploitation the East Texas Oil Field in the early 1900s. By 1931, 80-90% of obtainable oil was 
permanently lost underground due to the fragmentation of various enterprises all seeking to 
separately mine the ground without coordination with one another. This gross wastefulness of a 
natural resource was ultimately contrary to the best interest of the public. In a similar manner, the 
current patent landscape’s influence on data disclosure may encourage comparable wastefulness.  
Technology transfer: where to go from here? 
 As previously mentioned, patent ownership by universities post-1980 helped to stimulate 
innovation and national competitiveness in the field of biotechnology (Rai). However, the trend 
of the past 20 years is leaning toward a future in which patents are a less profitable (“diminishing 
returns”) means of protecting one’s innovation (Rai). The Supreme Court’s decision on Myriad 
caused great uncertainty within the technology transfer community as to the patent eligibility of 
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natural products. The ruling contained many ambiguities. For example, how many modifications 
would be necessary to establish a molecule sufficiently different from that of Myriad’s BRCA1/2 
cDNA sequences? In the rise of uncertainty post-Myriad, patent attorneys turned to 
recommending new methods of protection for innovation rather than a reliance solely on patents, 
including protection of an innovation by trade secret and a multitude of modifications to the 
naturally occurring DNA or proteins in question (Ledford). Advantages to trade secrets include 
no requirement of public disclosure of the claim, such as is required for patent acquisition, and 
no time limit to the claim as long as the secret is maintained (Chand). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SURVEY OF AUTM MEMBERS – UNIVERSITY & COLLEGE STAFF  
Evaluation of Myriad impact: Research Methodology 
Exempting instances of research into targeted therapeutics—such as those offered by 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.—at the time of the Supreme Court’s ruling, little objective evidence 
existed to support the claims that gene patents impeded basic scientific research (Offit). Claims 
were made on both sides as to whether the Myriad decision would ultimately promote or impede 
greater innovation, especially in regard to natural products. Due to the impact of technology 
transfer in the growing field of biotechnology, this question has been of particular importance to 
academic research. Through AUTM, a string of economic evaluations has been conducted 
through survey responses to collect quantifiable data on 1996-2015. Rather than collect 
additional economic data, this study focused on qualitative data collection with three goals: to 
evaluate (a) the current attitudes of technology transfer professionals at academic institutions 
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(universities and colleges) toward Myriad’s impact on their profession, (b) its impact on natural 
product patenting and (c) the success of new strategies employed to protect innovation.  
This study chose to focus solely on technology transfer personnel who are directly 
employed by a U.S. University or College. Other small business and nonprofit entities—namely 
hospitals and research institutes (HRI)—have been demonstrated to have similar patenting 
tendencies to universities and colleges and close ties with their personnel (Pressman). However, 
the technology transfer environment is different due to the additional emphasis on cultivating an 
educational, entrepreneurial culture with both faculty researchers and students. While 
commercialization is an important aspect of technology transfer, it is not necessarily the primary 
focus for University and College research innovation. The focus of HRI groups is heavily 
skewed toward economic impact. According to an economic review released in 2017 by the 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), HRI’s reported both a higher average 
of License Income Received and of Running Royalties than did Universities and Colleges. Due 
to the stronger bias of HRIs toward an economic emphasis, AUTM members from this category 
were excluded from the study. In addition to personnel of independent research institutions and 
hospitals, the following categories of AUTM members were also removed from evaluation for 
this study: private industry members, attorneys and legal firms, students and faculty, 
professionals residing outside of the United States, and public communications personnel / office 
managers from university and college tech transfer offices (positions that do not deal directly 
with patenting). The remaining population of interest – approximately 900 individuals – 
comprised staff from both university and college technology transfer offices who held 
membership in AUTM. For the remainder of this paper, the term “university” will be used to 
refer generally to both university and college academic institutions. 
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The selection of the sample population aimed to reduce participation bias (resulting from 
a lack of survey response) and collect representative data of the population of AUTM members 
in university and college tech transfer. Originally, the survey was going to be sent to all ~900 of 
the previously determined population. However, a great discrepancy was identified in the 
number of staff employed between the various academic institutions who were represented in 
AUTM. Some university/college tech transfer offices had only 2-3 staff with AUTM 
membership; others had upwards of 20. With this great of a difference, the staff of larger tech 
transfer offices could dramatically skew the results of the survey if there were a high response 
from those institutions. Therefore, in order to better control for the influence of tech transfer 
offices that employed significantly larger staffs, only up to five staff members from any 
university/college were invited to participate in the survey for this study. The limit of five 
participants aimed to maximize the chance of receiving at least one response from these 
institutions while keeping their potential influence on survey data within range of that of smaller 
tech transfer offices. The five survey recipients from each large tech transfer office were selected 
randomly. From the remaining population of ~900 AUTM members, contacts were sorted by 
university/college, each was assigned a number, and then five survey recipients were selected 
using a random number generator. After this process, 737 employees of U.S. universities and 
colleges were identified for the target population. 
Each individual selected for this study received an email inviting them to participate in a 
Qualtrics survey of 18 question sections regarding the impact of Myriad (2013) on academic 
technology transfer. Data collection occurred over 13 days (28 March 2019 at approximately 
noon until 10 April 2019 at 11pm). During this time period, four reminder emails were sent 
through the email list, inviting the eligible AUTM members to participate. Of the 75 respondents 
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who consented to participate in the survey, 9 were removed from analysis due low familiarity in 
the subject matter (determined by a response “Not knowledgeable at all” to questions of their 
familiarity with a) the U.S. Patent system [Q1] and/or b) Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc. [Q3]. An additional four respondents elected to discontinue participation 
after the first few questions. After removing these individuals, the remaining sample size for data 
analysis was 62 respondents. This system of participant selection may have resulted in more than 
one staff member responding from any given institution. However, this concern was outweighed 
by that of low survey participation and insufficient data. 
Findings & Discussion 
 The survey that was sent out focused on collecting data in the following six areas: (1) 
demographics of survey respondents, (2) patenting behaviors post-Myriad, (3) attitudes toward 
patenting (in general), (4) attitudes toward Myriad, (5) the use of certain patenting strategies 
post-Myriad, and (6) attitudes toward those same strategies (perception of their effectiveness). Of 
these, the first 5 sections received sufficient survey response for a statistically significant data 
analysis, but section 6 encountered several problems. Firstly, the response to section 6 was too 
low for a student’s t-test analysis. In addition, there appears to have been confusion as to the 
nature of the question, likely occurring from the setup of the survey. Due to these issues, this 
study disregarded section 6 for further data analysis, although the responses are shown on pages 
48-49 next to the responses from section 5.  
As expected within the demographics section, a large percentage of the survey 
respondents (88.70%) had a STEM background in higher education (within fields including 
biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, and engineering), with 53.23% holding a doctorate. 
The range for years of experience in technology transfer was quite large: ranging from 1 to 35. 
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Due to this wide range in years of experience, the demographic of individuals who were working 
within the field of technology transfer before the Myriad ruling (prior to 2013) and those who 
began tech transfer employment afterward was split 43 to 21 (67.19% to 32.81%). However, the 
majority of respondents (90.32%) agreed that they would be comfortable explaining the Myriad 
case to a layperson [Q4-1]. 
Those individuals who had worked in tech transfer before the Myriad ruling were 
presented a question [Q9] regarding the patenting behaviors of their university of employment 
for natural products pre- and post-Myriad. Of these respondents, none claimed an increase in 
natural product patent claims since the Myriad ruling. The majority of respondents (73.17%) for 
Q9 claimed of slightly lesser or substantially lesser number of natural product patents pursued 
post-Myriad. This trend is consistent with the early projected outcomes of the Myriad decision: a 
decrease in natural product patent pursuit. Questions regarding the patenting practices of 
universities post-Myriad [Q10-13] were presented to participants of all years of tech transfer 
experience. Consistent with the response to Q9, the majority of total survey respondents 
(82.14%) claimed that their university had chosen on at least one occasion to not pursue a natural 
product patent due to Myriad restrictions [Q13]. This can likely be attributed to economic 
concerns of investing money into a claim that will not result in obtaining a patent. Only a small 
minority of respondents cited the invalidation of a natural product patent (4 respondents, 9.09%) 
[Q12] or a prior/ongoing dispute of a natural product patent claim (9 respondents, 18.37%) [Q11] 
on the basis of Myriad. Although these percentages may seem low, they are arguably quite 
significant. Due to the high associated legal fees, these processes (particularly the invalidation of 
a patent) are rarely pursued for any type of patent. Therefore, the frequency of respondents citing 
an invalidation or dispute of one of their natural product claims was higher than expected for this 
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size of a sample group (62 respondents). On the question of whether the majority of the natural 
product claims pursued at the respondents’ universities of employment post-Myriad had received 
approval, 76.09% of respondents answered “no”. These findings seem to support a general 
decrease in both natural product patent pursuit and acquisition for university tech transfer offices.  
 In regards to patenting in general, the majority of respondents classified themselves as 
“very” or “extremely knowledgeable” of the U.S. Patent system compared to other tech transfer 
professionals [Q1]. A majority also agreed to having a confident understanding of U.S. 
regulations that affect patenting [Q2-1]. Respondents demonstrated a strongly favorable response 
to the impact of patents on research progress and investments [Q14-1,3]. The majority also 
agreed to the statement that “patents promote economic investments into producing / marketing 
new products” [Q14-2]. These responses were consistent with those expected of professionals in 
the technology transfer field. 
 More specifically regarding Myriad, the responses supported a fairly nuanced view 
toward Myriad that slightly leans in favor of the ruling’s critics. Respondents were split fairly 
evenly when presented the statement “The impact of Myriad on university tech transfer has been 
solely negative”, with a slight majority agreeing [Q15-4]. For the statement, “Myriad promoted 
research progress by allowing broader study/use of some genes” [Q15-3], respondents were split 
again, with a slight majority disagreeing. However, the majority of respondents (77.42%) did 
agree that post-Myriad, “natural product patents are a risky university investment, due to the 
likelihood of future patent invalidation” [Q15-2]. This response was particularly interesting, 
considering that less than 10% of respondents responded that their university had actually had a 
natural product patent invalidated [Q12]. 
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 In the wake of Myriad, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded patent protection for 
natural products. The ruling stood at odds with years of USPTO precedents, which had largely 
permitted gene patents such as those held by Myriad Genetics, Inc. for BRCA1/2. Patent 
attorneys began recommending new strategies for drafting patent claims, as well as alternative 
methods of protection for innovation besides just patents. The following six strategies were 
recommended specifically for DNA technologies in an educational web seminar through 
Technology Transfer Central: “Analyzing and Adapting to the Supreme Court’s Myriad Ruling” 
(Noonan): 
 
Patenting strategy Majority Response 
Q16-1 “Reissued an existing patent to narrow the scope of 
the claim” 
The majority of respondents 
had not used this strategy 
Q16-2 “Protected specific claims with trade secret rather 
than patent” 
Respondents who had not 
used this strategy constitute a 
small majority 
Q16-3 “Made a generic disclosure of modifications rather 
than giving specific examples” 
Respondents who had not 
used this strategy constituted 
a small majority 
Q16-4 “Sought patent for isolated [and/or modified] cDNA 
copy of a nucleic acid” 
Respondents were split 
pretty evenly between “Yes” 
and “No” 
Q16-5 “Sought patent for cDNA-specific oligonucleotide” Respondents were split 
pretty evenly between “Yes” 
and “No” 
Q16-6 “Distinguished a nucleic acid patent claim from that 
of a natural product using labeling, cross-linkage or 
linkage to ‘x’ (x = biotin, fluorophore, etc.) 
The majority of respondents 
had used this strategy 
 
 As previously stated, due to low response and the appearance of confusion for at least 
some respondents on Q17, data on perceptions toward these patenting strategies cannot be 
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considered statistically significant; as such, any differences between “Yes” and “No” responses 
cannot be said to be more than expected variation. Perhaps the exact patenting strategies detailed 
in this question, while encountered by university technology professionals, are more directly the 
concern of the patent attorneys with whom they work. A potential future avenue of research 
might be to explore a more quantitative approach to this question through literature review of the 
actual university natural product patent claims. 
 Due to the large sample size of respondents for sections 1-5, much of the data was 
determined to be statistically significant based on the assumptions of the Central Limit Theorem. 
However, there are several factors that may prevent the surveyed population from being an 
accurate representation of the desired population of interest: AUTM members who are 
professionals in university technology transfer. For example, due to concerns for keeping survey 
responses anonymous, respondents were not asked the name of their university/college of 
employment. For those academic institutions of smaller staffs with AUTM membership, this 
information alone could have revealed their identity. However, without this information, this 
survey could not take into account differences such as the level of emphasis for any academic 
institution on research involving natural products, or the economic resources and funding 
uniquely available to the different institutions. The survey may also have a nonresponse bias if 
certain segments of a population (for example, the technology transfer offices with significantly 
larger staffs) were not represented by the respondents who took the survey.  
Sections 1-5 of this study achieved statistically significant results; however, as mentioned 
above, several variables may have prevented the sample population from fully representing the 
target population. In addition, while this study focused on the impact of Myriad on university 
and college natural product patenting, this is by no means an isolated issue. As covered in the 
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background, several important cases led up to the Myriad decision and carried with them their 
own precedents for patenting natural products. While the results of this study point to certain 
influences of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Myriad decision, it is by no means the single causal base 
for today’s natural product patenting environment. However, the Myriad case is undoubtedly an 
important landmark in the clarification process for the patentability of “natural products” within 
the advancing biotechnology industry.   
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QUALTRICS: Pre-Survey Consent Form 
Purpose: In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in "Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc." 
necessitated a change to patenting strategies for "natural products" by all U.S. entities, including universities. The 
purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of this ruling on the ability for university technology transfer 
offices to obtain "natural product" patents. 
  
What to Expect: You have been invited to participate in this research project as a member of the Association of 
University Technology Managers. This survey on the online Qualtrics platform has been designed to assess 
impacts of Myriad (2013) on natural product patenting. Information gathered from this survey will only be 
reported in aggregate form. Aggregate data from this survey will be used for a written undergraduate Honors 
thesis and subsequent thesis defense on the Oklahoma State University campus, and may also be used for future 
publication. Participation is completely voluntary. Participants can withdraw from the survey at any time without 
reprisal or penalty. You will be expected to complete the questionnaire once. It is expected to take no more than 5 
minutes to complete. 
 
Risks: There are no risks associated with this project which are expected to be greater than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and confidential. You may 
choose to answer only some questions, or to withdraw your consent and participation in this research survey at 
any time. 
 
Benefits: No direct benefit is anticipated for survey participants. By acquiring this data, the researchers will be 
able to produce a better academic understanding of natural product patenting at university tech transfer offices 
and the impact of Myriad (2013) on these practices. 
  
Compensation: Participants will not receive compensation for participation in this survey. 
  
Confidentiality: This survey is anonymized to not record any personal information and to remove contact 
association. All survey data will be stored on a password protected computer, and only the researchers will have 
access to these records. Information gathered from this survey will be reported in aggregate form. 
   
If you choose to participate: You have the right to discontinue the survey at any time without penalty, as it is 
voluntary. If you agree to participate in the web research survey, click on the following Internet address to 
continue: 
 
By clicking below, you are indicating that you freely and voluntarily agree to participate in this study and you also 
acknowledge that you are a member of the Association of University Technology Managers. 
 
Answer % Count 
I consent 100.00% 75 
I do not consent 0.00% 0 
Total 100% 75 
 
NOTE: Two individuals who consented to the study later opted to discontinue after a few questions. 
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QUESTION PURPOSE:  
IDENTIFY AND REMOVE RESPONDENTS WITH LOW FAMILIARITY 








1.00 5.00 2.16 0.91 0.82 73 
 
 
Answer % Count 
Extremely knowledgeable (5) 21.92% 16 
Very knowledgeable (4) 49.32% 36 
Moderately knowledgeable (3) 21.92% 16 
Slightly knowledgeable (2) 4.11% 3 
Not knowledgeable at all (1) 2.74% 2 
Total 100% 73 
 
 




DEMOGRAPHICS: UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. PATENTING 

















Q2-1 "I have a confident understanding of U.S. 




















Q2-2 "I regularly work with legal professionals 




















Q2-3 "I could explain the general legal procedure 






























DEMOGRAPHICS: UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. PATENTING 
Q2_1 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q2_1): p-value = 1.454e-08 
  95% CI (α = 0.05), H0 = Normality 
  p-value < α, so reject null hypothesis 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to having a 
confident understanding of U.S. patenting? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (5.940597, 6.414242) 
  t = 52.159, df = 61 
  mean = 6.177419, sd = 0.932548, variance = 0.8696457 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to having a confident understanding of U.S. patenting.  
 
Q2_2 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q2_2): p-value = 4.708e-15 
  95% CI (α = 0.05) → p-value < α, so reject null hypothesis (Normality) 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to working regularly with legal professionals? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (6.559293, 6.956836) 
  t = 67.985, df = 61 
  mean = 6.758065, sd = 0.7827125, variance = 0.6126388 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to working regularly with legal professionals. 
 
Q2_3 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q2_3): p-value = 2.597e-13 (p-value < α (α = 0.05)); not Normally distributed 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to being able to explain patenting to a layperson? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (6.589873, 6.893998) 
  t = 88.657, df = 61 
  mean = 6.741935, sd = 0.5987825, variance = 0.3585405 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to being able to explain patenting to a layperson. 
 
 
LIKERT SCALE:  
STRONGLY AGREE (7) 
AGREE (6) 
SOMEWHAT AGREE (5) 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (4) 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE (3) 
DISAGREE (2) 




QUESTION PURPOSE:  
IDENTIFY AND REMOVE RESPONDENTS WITH LOW FAMILIARITY 
Q3 - Please rank your familiarity with Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court, 2013) compared to other tech transfer professionals: 
 
 




1.00 5.00 2.72 1.03 1.06 72 
 
 
Answer % Count 
Extremely knowledgeable (5) 6.94% 5 
Very knowledgeable (4) 40.28% 29 
Moderately knowledgeable (3) 36.11% 26 
Slightly knowledgeable (2) 6.94% 5 
  Not knowledgeable at all (1) 9.72% 7 
Total 100% 72 
 
 




DEMOGRAPHICS: UNDERSTANDING OF MYRIAD CASE 

















Q4-1 "I would be comfortable explaining Myriad

























Q4-2 "My job has included formal training, 
























Q4-3 "I frequently encounter Myriad (2013) in 






























DEMOGRAPHICS: UNDERSTANDING OF MYRIAD CASE 
Q4_1 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q4_1): p-value = 8.261e-09 
  95% CI (α = 0.05), H0 = Normality 
  p-value < α, so reject null hypothesis 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to being 
comfortable explaining Myriad to a layperson? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (5.484827, 6.095818) 
  t = 37.901, df = 61 
  mean = 5.790323, sd = 1.202962, variance = 1.447118 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to being comfortable explaining Myriad to a layperson. 
 
Q4_2 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q4_2): p-value = 3.038e-05 
  95% CI (α = 0.05) → p-value < α, so reject null hypothesis (Normality) 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to having had formal job training on Myriad? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (3.936005, 4.999479) 
  t = 16.801, df = 61 
  mean = 4.467742, sd = 2.093845, variance = 4.384188 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to having had formal job training on Myriad. 
 
Q4_3 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q4_3): p-value = 4.694e-05 (p-value < α (α = 0.05)); not Normally distributed 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to frequently encountering Myriad in their job? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (4.776033, 5.546548) 
  t = 26.789, df = 61 
  mean = 5.16129, sd = 1.517046, variance = 2.301428 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to frequently encountering Myriad in their job. 
  
 
LIKERT SCALE:  
STRONGLY AGREE (7) 
AGREE (6) 
SOMEWHAT AGREE (5) 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (4) 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE (3) 
DISAGREE (2) 




DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 





Q6 - If you responded "Yes" to the previous question, what degree(s) have you 
completed in a STEM field? (Please select all that apply). 
 
 
Other - Text 












"Do you have a STEM degree (e.g. biology, chemistry, 

















Associate's degree (2 yrs)
Bachelor's degree (4 yrs)





DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: TECH TRANSFER EXPERIENCE 
Q7 - Approximately how many years in total have you worked in technology transfer? 








Q8 - Were you working within the field of technology transfer before the Myriad court 
decision (prior to 2013)? 
 
 










































Note: Question 9 below was only shown to respondents who responded “yes” to the prior question 
(Question 8), affirming that they were working in technology transfer before the Myriad decision. 
 
MEASURING: PATENTING BEHAVIORS POST-MYRIAD 
Q9 – Since the Myriad (2013) ruling, my university of employment has pursued _____ 
number of natural product patents than before Myriad.  
Note: “natural product” is defined as a substance produced by life, found in or derived 
from nature (e.g. nucleic acids, foods, bacteria, proteins and peptides, chemicals from 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q9): p-value = 1.581e-06 
  95% CI (α = 0.05), H0 = Normality 
  p-value < α, so reject null hypothesis 
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (41) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that respondents agree to their 
university pursuing a lesser number of natural product patents 
post-Myriad? 
  p-value < 2.2e-16 (p-value < α, so reject H0) 
  95% CI is D ∈ (1.566108, 2.092429) 
  t = 14.049, df = 40 
  mean = 1.829268, sd = NA, variance = NA 
Conclusion: Data supports that respondents agree to their university pursuing a lesser number of natural 













A substantially greater (5)
A slightly greater (4)
Approximately the same (3)
A slightly lesser (2)
A substantially lesser (1)
NO RESPONSE
 
LIKERT SCALE:  
(5) SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER # 
(4) SLIGHTLY GREATER # 
(3) APPROX THE SAME # 
(2) SLIGHTLY LESSER # STRONGLY  




MEASURING: PATENTING BEHAVIORS POST-MYRIAD 
 
Q10 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q10): p-value = 9.674e-11 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (45) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of n.p. patents pursued post-Myriad were approved? 







Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q11): p-value = 4.885e-12 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (49) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of n.p. patents held post-Myriad are/have been disputed? 










Q10  "The majority of natural product patents 
pursued post-Myriad (since 2013) by your 















Q11 "Your current university of employment 
holds natural product patents that have been / 
are currently being actively disputed on the 




“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 








Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 45 
“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 








Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 49 
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MEASURING: PATENTING BEHAVIORS POST-MYRIAD 
 
Q12 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q12): p-value = 1.11e-13 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (48) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the maj. of resp. have had at least one n.p. patent invalidated by Myriad? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q12): p-value = 8.206e-13 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (55) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Q: Does the data support that the majority of resp. have chosen not to pursue a n.p. patent due to Myriad?  
Conclusion: Yes, the data supports that the majority of respondents have chosen not to pursue a n.p. patent due 











Q12 "Your current university of employment 
has had at least one natural product patent 














Q13 "Your current university of employment 
has chosen not to pursue a natural product 





“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 








Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 48 
“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 








Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 55 
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MEASURING: ATTITUDES TOWARD PATENTING (IN GENERAL) 
Q14 - Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
Q14_1 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q14-1): p-value = 2.224e-10 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q14-1? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q14-2): p-value = 4.865e-12 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q14-2? 










































Q14-2 "Patents promote economic investments 
















Std Deviation 1.129855 
Variance 1.276573 








Std Deviation 1.135924 
Variance 1.290323 
Response # 62 
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MEASURING: ATTITUDES TOWARD PATENTING (IN GENERAL) 
Q14 (cont.)- Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
Q14_3 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q14_3): p-value = 1.74e-09 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q14-3? 










































Std Deviation 1.341286 
Variance 1.799048 
Response # 62 
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MEASURING: ATTITUDES TOWARD MYRIAD 
Q15 - Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
Q15_1 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q15-1): p-value = 7.829e-05 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q15-1? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q15-2): p-value = 5.381e-06 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (61) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q15-2? 
















Q15-1 "Myriad (2013) has minimally impacted 






















Q15-2 "Natural product patents are a risky 
















Std Deviation 1.408687 
Variance 1.9844 











Std Deviation 1.39 
Variance 1.96 
Response # 61 
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MEASURING: ATTITUDES TOWARD MYRIAD 
Q15 (cont.) - Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
Q15_3 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q15_3): p-value = 0.004014 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q15-3? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q15_4): p-value = 0.00264 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (62) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents agree with the statement in Q15-4? 















Q15-3 "Myriad promoted research progress by 























Q15-4 "The impact of Myriad on university tech 
















Std Deviation 1.587314 
Variance 2.519566 
Response # 62 
Mean 4.306452 
t-value 24.26 





Std Deviation 1.397758 
Variance 1.953728 
Response # 62 
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MEASURING: USE OF CERTAIN PATENTING STRATEGIES POST-MYRIAD 
Q16 - To your knowledge, have any of these strategies been used at your current 
university of employment in a natural product patent application post-Myriad   
(since 2013)? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16_1): p-value = 1.3e-13 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (50) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-1? 











Q16-1 "Reissued an existing patent to narrow 




“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.9 
t-value 44.333 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 62 
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MEASURING: USE OF CERTAIN PATENTING STRATEGIES POST-MYRIAD 
 
Q16_2 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16-2): p-value = 1.059e-10 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (54) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-2? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16-3): p-value = 2.961e-09 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (42) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-3? 














Q16-2 "Protected specific claims with trade 















Q16-3 "Made a generic disclosure of 





“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.62963 
t-value 24.568 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 54 
“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.619048 
t-value 21.348 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 42 
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MEASURING: USE OF CERTAIN PATENTING STRATEGIES POST-MYRIAD 
 
Q16_4 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16-4): p-value = 2.616e-09 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (45) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-4? 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16_5): p-value = 2.25e-09 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (45) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-5? 











Q16-4 "Sought patent for isolated [and/or 




















“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.511111 
t-value 20.052 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 45 
“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.555556 
t-value 20.765 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 45 
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MEASURING: USE OF CERTAIN PATENTING STRATEGIES POST-MYRIAD 
 
Q16_6 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Q16-5): p-value = 5.366e-09 (p-value < α (α = 0.05))  
Histogram Overlay: bell curve, sufficient sample size > 30 (39) 
t-test (H0 : D = 0 → no difference), α = 0.05 (95% CI) 
Question: Does the data support that the majority of respondents have used the strategy in Q16-6? 














Q16-6 "Distinguished a nucleic acid patent claim from 
that of a natural product using labeling, cross-linkage 




“I don’t know” removed 
from t-test analysis 
Yes = 1, No = 2 
Mean 1.358974 
t-value 17.464 





Std Dev/ Var. NA 
Response # 39 
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MEASURING: ATTITUDES TOWARD CERTAIN PATENTING STRATEGIES POST-MYRIAD 
Q17 - In your own opinion, have those strategies to which you responded "yes" above 
been generally successful in protecting existing patents of your university and/or in 
obtaining new patents? 
 




















RESPONSE CONFUSION → POSSIBLY A RESULT OF SURVEY SETUP 
More respondents ended up answering this question than just those who responded “yes” to 
strategies in Question 16. Therefore, at least some respondents in this section would have 
answered without having used the strategy themselves at their current university of 
employment. 
 
INSUFFICIENT SAMPLE SIZE FOR STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ANALYSIS 
The Shapiro-Wilk normality test for each of the following questions revealed that the data 
was not Normally distributed. The Central Limit Theorem would have allowed for a student’s 
t-test still if the data sets were “sufficiently large” (generally agreed to be n > 30 for data 
demonstrating a mound-shaped / bell curve histogram overlay). However, the data sets did 
not meet this size requirement either. 
“For practitioners, the histogram (for shape) and the sample size are more important than 












R Software Code – Statistical Analysis of Qualtrics Data 
 
 
###### R Analysis of Myriad Qualtrics Survey 
###### Below: Sample code used for stats of each question 
###### variable “x” below = question #  
 
### Source Additional Functions 
### Credit for function code to Professor Ole J. Forsberg 
source(“http://rfs.kvasaheim.com/rfs.R”) 
 
### Import Qualtrics Datafile 
dt = read.csv(‘C:\\Users\\Smolive\\Desktop\\MQR.csv’, header = TRUE) 
attach(dt) 
 
### Perform Shapiro-Wilk test for Normality 
### null hypothesis : normally distributed population 
### alpha level of 0.05 
### if p-value > cannot reject null hypothesis 
shapiroTest(x) 
 
### Draw histogram with a Normal curve for reference 
### Central Limit Theorem: is sample size “large enough” 
### mound-shaped/bell curve, n=30 is enough 
### U-shaped, preferred sample size of n=100 
overlay(x) 
 
### Determine sample size 
length(x) 
 





###### Additional charts created from R 
















References for Honors Thesis 
Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. No. 12-398. Supreme Court of 
the United States. 13 June 2013. 28 August 2018. 
<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-398_1b7d.pdf>. 
Association of University Technology Managers. n.d. Bayh-Doyle Talking Points. 24 April 2019. 
<https://autm.net/AUTM/media/About-Tech-
Transfer/Documents/BayhDoleTalkingPointsFINAL1193.pdf>. 
—. "AUTM 2017 Licensing Activity Survey." 2017. 24 April 2019. 
<https://autm.net/AUTM/media/SurveyReportsPDF/AUTM_2017_US_Licensing_Survey_no_app
endix.pdf>. 
—. Bayh-Doyle Act: Landmark Law Helped Universities Lead the Way. n.d. 24 April 2019. 
<https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/advocacy/legislation/bayh-dole-act/>. 
—. What is Tech Transfer, Anyway? n.d. 24 April 2019. <https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/what-is-
tech-transfer/>. 
Cartwright-Smith, Lara. "Patenting Genes: What Does "Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics" Mean for Genetics Testing and Research?" Public Health Reports 129.3 (2014): 289-
292. 28 August 2018. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3982540/>. 
Chandrasekharan, Subhashini, Amy L McGuire and Ignatia B Van den Veyver. "Do recent US Supreme 
Court rulings on patenting of genes and genetic diagnostics affect the practice of genetic 
screening and diagnosis in prenatal and reproductive care?" Prenatal Diagnosis 34.10 (2014): 
921-926. 28 August 2018. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4293120/>. 
Cook-Deegan, Robert and Arti K Rai. "DNA Sequence Patents are not in the grave yet." Nature 
Biotechnology 27.122 (2009). 28 August 2018. 
<http://www.nature.com.argo.library.okstate.edu/articles/nbt0209-122>. 
Cook-Deegan, Robert, et al. "The next controversy in genetic testing: clinical data as trade secrets?" 
European Journal of Human Genetics 21 (2012): 585-8. 24 April 2019. 
<https://www.nature.com/articles/ejhg2012217.pdf>. 
Coticchia, Mark E. "CFR Encourages to Discuss Kauffman Proposal on Technology Transfer with Campus 
Officials." 7 January 2010. Case Western Response to "Harvard Business Review". 24 April 2019. 
<https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/CaseWesternResponsetoAA
UreHBR.pdf>. 
Crespi, R. S. Patenting in the Biological Sciences. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1982. 
David, Jeffrey M. and Kristin L. Yohannan. "The Myriad Appeal: Is Isolated Human DNA Patentable?" 




de Winter, Joost C. F. and Dimitra Dodou. "Five-Point Likert Items: t test versus Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon." Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 15.11 (2010). 30 April 2019. 
<https://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=15&n=11>. 
"Divided Appeals Court Again Rules That Companies May Patent Breast Cancer Genes, but Invalidates 
Patents Comparing the Genes." Targeted News Service (2012). 29 April 2019. 
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1033686564/fulltext/1F096FA1990C41B9PQ/1?account
id=4117>. 
Evans, Barbara J. "Mining the human genome after "Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics"." Genetics in Medicine 16.7 (2014): 504-509. 28 August 2018. 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4063888/>. 
Forsberg, Ole J. R for Starters: Advanced methods of research inquiry for the social sciences using the R 
statistical environment. Vol. 0.55721. 2015. <http://rfs.kvasaheim.com/index.php>. 
Frost, Jim. How to Analyze Likert Scale Data. 2019. 30 April 2019. 
<https://statisticsbyjim.com/hypothesis-testing/analyze-likert-scale-data/>. 
Graff, Grogory D, et al. "Not quite a myriad of gene patents." Nature Biotechnology 31 (2013): 404-410. 
24 April 2019. <https://www-nature-com.argo.library.okstate.edu/articles/nbt.2568>. 
Grubb, Philip W. & Thomsen, Peter R. Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology. 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Jaggar, Karuna. Myriad Genetics Finally Relinquishes Monopoly on BRCA Genes. 28 January 2015. 29 April 
2019. <https://bcaction.org/2015/01/28/myriad-genetics-finally-relinquishes-monopoly-on-
brca-genes/>. 
Lander, Eric S. "Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party." The Association for 
Molecular Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. (2013): 1-40. 5 May 2019. 
<https://www.broadinstitute.org/files/sections/about/12-398-ac-Lander.pdf>. 




Marshall, Eliot. "Supreme Court Rules Out Patents on 'Natural' Genes." Science 340.6139 (2013): 1387-8. 
24 April 2019. <https://www-jstor-
org.argo.library.okstate.edu/stable/41988709?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>. 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. No. 10-1150. U.S. Supreme Court. 20 
March 2012. <https://www.bitlaw.com/source/cases/patent/Mayo_v_Prometheus.html>. 
McDevitt, Valerie Landrio, et al. "More Than Money: The Exponential Impact of Academic Technology 





Murphy, Heather. "What 13,000 Patents Involving the DNA of Sea Life Tell Us About the Future." 17 
September 2018. The New York Times. March 2019. 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/science/patents-marine-
dna.html?action=click&module=Discovery&pgtype=Homepage>. 
"Myriad diagnostic concerns." Nature 31.7 (2013): 571. 24 April 2019. <https://www-nature-
com.argo.library.okstate.edu/articles/nbt.2638>. 
Noonan, Kevin E. Analyzing and Adapting to the Supreme Court’s Myriad Ruling. 8 August 2013. 
Webinar. 
Nussbaum, Robert. "Corporate Genetics." MIT Technology Review 116.5 (2013): 12-13. 
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1433119383/fulltextPDF/1E73E067F63B4250PQ/1?acco
untid=4117>. 
Office, United States Patent and Trademark. General information concerning patents. October 2015. 24 
April 2019. <https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents>. 
Offit, Kenneth, et al. "Gene Patents and Personalized Cancer Care: Impact of the "Myriad" Case on 
Clinical Oncology." Journal of Clinical Oncology 31.21 (2013): 2743-2748. 28 August 2018. 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5795665/>. 
Patel, Sailesh K. The Supreme Court's Mayo v. Prometheus Decision: The Implications for Biotechnology. 
23 March 2012. 2 October 2018. <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-s-
mayo-v-prometheus-decision-implications-biotechnology>. 
"Patently False." The Economist (Online) (2013). 29 April 2019. 
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1367713531/fulltext/54D834B866704608PQ/1?account
id=4117>. 
Phillips, Theresa. "The Top Countries for Biotech Firms and Research." 28 January 2019. The Balance. 5 
May 2019. <https://www.thebalance.com/ranking-the-top-biotech-countries-3973287>. 
Pradhan, Arundeep S. "Bayh-Doyle and University Technology Transfer Effectiveness." 6 January 2010. 
AUTM Letter to Department of Commerce. 24 April 2019. 
<https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/AUTMLtrtoDeptofCommerce
01-06-10.pdf>. 
Pressman, Lori, et al. "The Economic Contribution of University/Nonprofit Inventions in the United 
States: 1996-2015." Biotechnology Innovation Organization and the Association of University 
Technology Managers, June 2017. 24 April 2019. <https://autm.net/AUTM/media/About-
AUTM/Documents/AUTM_BIO_Economic_Impact_Report_2017.pdf>. 
Rai, Arti and Bhaven Sampat. "Accountability in patenting of federally funded research." Nature 
biotechnology 30.10 (2012): 953-956. 28 August 2018. 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3753070/>. 
Rai, Arti K and Jacob S Sherkow. "The changing life science patent landscape." Nature Biotechnology 34.3 
(2016): 292-294. 28 August 2018. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789262>. 
57 
 
—. "The changing life science patent landscape." Nature Biotechnology 34.3 (2016): 292-294. 28 August 
2018. <https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt.3504>. 
Rai, Arti K and Robert Cook-Deegan. "Moving Beyond "Isolated" Gene Patents." Science (2013). 28 
August 2018. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3807680/>. 
Rai, Arti K. "Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward." Stanford Law Review Online 
66.111 (2013). 28 August 2018. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2338751>. 
Rai, Arti. "Patentable subject matter at the Supreme Court: An exceptional case?" SCOTUSblog: Gene 
Patenting Symposium. 2013. February 2019. 
<https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/patentable-subject-matter-at-the-supreme-court-an-
exceptional-case/>. 
—. "Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives - A New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars." The New England 
Journal of Medicine 367 (2012): 491-493. 28 August 2018. 
<https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1206573>. 
Rockman, Howard B. Intellectual Property Law for Engineers and Scientists. Hoboken, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004. Hardcover. 
Rooksby, Jacob H. "Myriad Choices: University Patents under the Sun." (Spring 2013). 24 April 2019. 
<https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-2951915021/myriad-choices-university-patents-
under-the-sun>. 
Schuster, W. Michael. Patent Law and Managing Investments in Technology. Vol. 1.0. Oklahoma State 
University, 2016. Book. 
Schwartz, David. "Uncertainty reigns in wake of Supreme Court’s Myriad decision." 18 September 2013. 
Tech Transfer Central's Tech Transfer eNews Blog. 
<https://techtransfercentral.com/2013/09/18/uncertainty-reigns-wake-supreme-courts-myriad-
decision/>. 
Sullivan, Gail M. and Anthony R. Artino, Jr. "Analyzing and Interpreting Data From Likert-Type Scales." 
Journal of Graduate Medical Education 5.4 (2013): 541-542. 30 April 2019. 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3886444/>. 
Tansey, Bernadette. The building of biotech / 25 years later, 1980 Bayh-Dole act honored as foundation 
of an industry. 21 June 2005. 24 April 2019. <https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/The-
building-of-biotech-25-years-later-1980-2660978.php>. 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration. What are "Biologics" Questions and Answers. n.d. 23 April 2019. 
<https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/uc
m133077.htm>. 





Unknown. Analysing Likert Scale/Type Data. n.d. 30 April 2019. <https://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/media/capod/students/mathssupport/Likert.pdf>. 
USPTO. "The 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance." Federal Register 84 (4). United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, 2019. 5 May 2019. 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf>. 
Wong, Alice Yuen-Ting and Albert Wai-Kit Chan. "Myriad and its implications for patent protection of 
isolated natural products in the United States." Chinese Medicine 9.17 (2014). 29 April 2019. 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4086272/>. 
 
 
